

II. Military Officers

1. Atalyk or Commander in Chief.
2. Parmanachi or General.
3. Dacha or Colonel.
4. Min-Bashi or Commander of 1,000 men.
5. Panzar-Bashi or Commander of 500 men.
6. Yus-Bashi or Captain.

/179/ /Figure 63, p. 26a. Caption: The highest dignitaries of Bukhara: Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher)./

/180/ In addition to the functionaries of the highest rank, there are also countless multitudes of lower court officials; astrologists, scribes, policemen, cooks, grooms, dancers, comedians, etc., whose primary task is to loaf around all day about the court in the capital, and in the event of a festive reception, to clothe themselves in gold brocade, and to line up on both sides with staffs of office in their hands, so they may enhance the reputation of their lord by their number and the richness of their clothing. For in Turkestan the rank and authority of a man is measured only by the number of his servants. For this reason there is no one in Turkestan who would not consider it necessary to surround himself with a suite of individuals of still lower rank, no matter how low a rank he might hold in society. In Tashkent I once engaged as a stable-boy a ten year old Sart lad whom I had picked up off the street, half starved and in rags. But when I once sent him to the bazaar to fetch five pounds of sugar, he appeared attended by two other streetlads, each carrying a package of sugar for him, for as an employee of a tyura he considered it beneath his dignity to carry the packages himself.

For these reasons it is impossible in Turkestan for a person of high place to travel without a disproportionately large crowd of attendants. For the interpreter, the servants, guides and grooms whom one hires consider it unavoidably necessary to take along their own grooms for their use and comfort and to add to their prestige, and these in turn, whenever possible, engage stableboys, in order to make as great a parade as possible, and so one finally has a train of fifty or more people with even more horses to drag along, feed and house.

The courts of the various begs (Figure 64, p. 27a) are on a small scale the same as the court of the khan is on a grand scale, and they have an official hierarchy which though less numerous is similar to that

644
701

1: von Schwabe--26a N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RLI Turkestan RLI



Fig. 1. The highest dignitaries of Bukhara; Right below, the Commander in Chief of the Troops (after a photograph by G. Merzbacher).

662 had been simply discharged by Muzafar's son and heir, and some
635 had been executed.

652 Since most of the taxes are collected in kind, the officials,
662 both those of the emir and those appointed by the begs are supported by them, and their servants all the way down to the last stableboy receive their wages in kind. This pay consists of a certain amount of clothes, and a stipulated quantity of barley and wheat, which is always divided among them at harvest time. In general, these salaries are very low and make up only a minimal part of the working income of the officials and the servant personnel. Their main income consists of occasional gifts and what they manage to extort from the people on the basis of their degree of influence with the emir, the beg, and the higher officials. For the entire administration system in the Turkestan khanates rests exclusively upon bribes and favoritism, and as a result the cooks and the water pipe carriers often have more influence and consequently more income than the officials.

701 The power of the khans in the Uzbek khanates rested primarily
555 upon mercenary troops, who were recruited from all possible peoples and classes of society. Until the abolition of slavery by the Russians, Persian slaves, bought by the Turkmen, were particularly favored as soldiers, and as a result of their natural gifts they occupied many of the highest ranks among the officers. Runaway Russian Cossacks also wandered occasionally into the troops of the Central Asian khans and later played an outstanding role. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the Bukhara army at the time of the Russian conquest of Samarkand was a Cossack 'uriadnik' (non-commissioned officer) who had fled from Siberia. He drilled the regular troops of the emir and introduced the Russian commands, which are still in use among the Bukharans today. This former Cossack led a highly changeable life in Bukhara, and almost every week he had to start his career all over again from the beginning. Usually he got drunk on Sunday and committed some kind of terrible excess, for which he was demoted on Monday to the lowest rank. On Tuesday he was again advanced to officer's rank, and usually by Friday or Saturday he was once more the Commander-in-Chief, only by the next week to begin his career all over again. After his defeat at Samarkand, when he tried to make the emir understand that it would be impossible to carry on the battle against the far superior Russians, the latter had his head cut off for this lack of patriotism. The emir then took over the command in person, but without noticeably better luck.

person, but without noticeably better luck.

901 /185/ In Bukhara the mercenary troops mentioned above, designated as 'sarbaz' were and are until today made up of infantry and artillery (Figure 65, 66, and 67, p. 31a, 32a, and 32b.) /Figure 65: Caption: [714] The former regular army of Kokand./ The uniform of the sarbaz consists of tall black sheepskin caps, similar to those of the Turkmen, of /186/ heavy leather boots, red khalats or jackets with stand-up collars, and broad yellow breeches, which are put over the khalat and the boots. Soliders uniformed in this manner can have little claim to grace; for as a result of the khalats being stuffed into the trousers, their physical bulk, especially in back is so voluminous as to be strongly reminiscent of Kazakh fat-tailed sheep. The artillerymen have blue coats with red collars. Officers and non-commisioned officers wear in addition long coats made of cloth of red, blue or green, according to their branch of service, and long curved sabers. On top of this they adorn themselves with all possible kinds of cast-off Russian officers' epaulettes and officials' shoulder-straps, which they have received from Russian officers and officials as gifts, or bought from Jewish old-clothes dealers. The arms [713] of the infantry consists of weapons of all possible forms and calibers, beginning with the short, massive blunderbusses from the time of the discovery of America, with a flaring muzzle, all the way to the double-barreled sporting gun of today. Very recently the Bukharan army also received a number of Berdan rifles, which were given the emir by the Emperor of Russia at the time of the coronation. The cannon are mostly muzzle-loaders of the same make. When on the march, the sarbaz are transported on the usual native two-wheeled wagons, since all the Central Asians are poor foot soldiers. The sarbaz infantry and artillery have value only in fighting the natives; when opposing European troops they are without any significance.

726 In case of war in Kokand and Bukhara, the whole remaining male population capable of bearing arms would be called up in addition to the sarbaz. This totally untrained and undisciplined militia was made up solely of cavalry, armed in the most diverse manner with lances, heavy sabers, flintlock and slow-match guns, sticks set in brass slings and bows, or even simply whips (nagaikas). (1)

1. In the last Kokand war (1876) the Russian met fighters who still wore visored helmets and iron coats of mail.




Fig. 31. The former regular army of Kokand.

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
 177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
 563 expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often
 completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the
 general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to
 the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for
 many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however,
 most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Rus-
 sian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and com-
 rades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian
 in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with
 life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect
 of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed
 his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most
 of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break
 which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet
 institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Rus-
 sian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and
 ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
 563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great
 distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was
 there much separation between Muslims and Russians.¹³ After an initial
 period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central
 Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turke-
 stani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military
 units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and
 anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
 162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert
 regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the
 Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic
 tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thou-
 sand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled
 existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agri-
 cultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic
 lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the
 economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 ¹³ More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
 563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet
 forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the
 prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer,
Vorkuta (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown
 factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permit-
 ting generalization on this subject.